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Abstract
We study the problem of agent-based nego-
tiation in combinatorial domains. It is dif-
ficult to reach optimal agreements in bilat-
eral or multi-lateral negotiations when the
agents’ preferences for the possible alter-
natives are not common knowledge. Self-
interested agents often end up negotiating in-
efficient agreements in such situations. In
this paper, we present a protocol for nego-
tiation in combinatorial domains which can
lead rational agents to reach optimal agree-
ments under incomplete information setting.
Our proposed protocol enables the negotiat-
ing agents to identify efficient solutions us-
ing distributed search that visits only a small
subspace of the whole outcome space. More-
over, the proposed protocol is sufficiently
general that it is applicable to most prefer-
ence representation models in combinatorial
domains. We also present results of exper-
iments that demonstrate the feasibility and
computational efficiency of our approach.
1 Introduction
Multi-issue negotiation is one of the most preferred ap-
proaches for resolving conflicts in agent society [4]. It
is being increasingly used in different multi-agent do-
mains including trading systems, resource allocation,
service level agreement negotiations, etc. [4, 9]. When
multiple issues are involved in negotiation simultane-
ously, the agents with divergent preferences can coop-
erate to reach agreements that are beneficial for each
other. But when the preferences of the participating
agents are not common knowledge, they often fail to
explore win-win possibilities and end up with ineffi-
cient results. Therefore, there is a need for negotia-
tion protocols which can lead rational agents to op-
timal agreements. By optimal or efficient agreement,
we refer to an agreement which is Pareto-optimal (or
Pareto-efficient) [7]. An alternative or outcome is
Pareto-optimal (or Pareto-efficient) if there exists no
other alternative which is at least as good as this al-
ternative for all agents and strictly better for at least
one agent.
In this paper, we focus on the negotiation problems
where the space of alternatives has a combinatorial
structure 1. For example, negotiations over multiple
indivisible goods or resources (where the number of
bundles an agent may obtain is exponential in the
number of goods or resources). When the negotiat-
ing agents know about the preferences of each other,
they can reach an efficient agreement using distributed
protocols like one-step monotonic concession protocol
or monotonic concession protocol [8], where each agent
searches the entire space of possible agreements. Sim-
ilar scenarios of multi-attribute decision-making with
complete information have also been studied in the
field of collective decision-making in combinatorial do-
mains, i.e. voting theory and preference aggregation
(for instance, [5], [7], [10] etc..), which determines
either one, some, or all optimal alternatives from a
given collection of the agents preferences according to
a given preference aggregation rule. However, most
negotiations in real life take place under incomplete
information where the agents do not have complete
knowledge about the preferences of the opponents.
Some protocols for negotiation over multiple indivisi-
ble resources in incomplete information scenarios have
been proposed by Brams and Taylor [2]. These pro-
tocols can produce optimal agreements only for nego-
tiating over multiple uncorrelated resources, i.e., situ-
ations where the utility of possessing two resources is
the sum of the utilities of possessing each individual
resource. The scenarios they considered are similar
to the negotiation problem in combinatorial domains
1The number of possible alternatives is exponential in
the number of attributes that are involved in negotiation
where the attributes are all independent. But real-
life negotiations typically involve inter-dependent at-
tributes and the decision-making process tends to be-
come much more complex. As an example, a research
group plan to order several PCs and the group mem-
bers need to decide on a standard group PC config-
uration. The decisions are not independent, because,
perhaps, the preferred operating systems may depend
on the given processor type. For instance, “I prefer to
choose WinXP operating system rather than Linux if
an Intel processor is given.” Hence, we cannot decide
on the issues separately. However, in the situations
of multiple interdependent or correlated issues, these
existing protocols can produce very inefficient agree-
ments in negotiation[9].
Our objective is to design an efficient protocol for
agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains,
which can lead participating agents to Pareto-optimal
agreements. We consider a completely uncertain ne-
gotiation scenario where participating agents do not
have any knowledge about the preferences of the other
agents; and the agents do not want to reveal their pref-
erences for the possible alternatives during the process
of negotiation. We propose a two phase negotiation
protocol POANCD (Protocol to reach Optimal agreement
in Negotiation over Combinatorial Domains). The first
phase of POANCD involves an iterative negotiation pro-
cess to generate a set of initial agreements that are
close to optimal. And then the second phase further
enhances the initial agreements to be Pareto-optimal
by searching for possible mutually beneficial agree-
ments.
Our proposed protocol makes a distinct contribution
from other existing voting protocols or aggregation
mechanisms in the sense that it is under purely in-
complete information setting and distributed manner.
Moreover, our protocol differs from most of the exist-
ing research in the field of utility-based negotiation.
Because it can not only handle quantitative prefer-
ences, but also works with purely qualitative prefer-
ence models. It is general enough to allow for a var-
ious types of preferences and representation models
in combinatorial domains. The preferences can be
cardinal (e.g. utilities) or ordinal preferences (prefer-
ence relations). And the representation models can be
based on conditional preferences, for instance CP-nets
[1] and its variants, which consist of a structural part
that expresses the links between variables, and a “ta-
ble” part containing the local preferences; or it can be
based on propositional logic (or possibly a fragment of
it), for instance prioritized goals, distance-based goals,
weighted goals, bidding languages for combinatorial
auctions. Another advantage of our proposed protocol
is that each agent is required to consider only a small
subset of alternatives instead of the entire outcome
space. It requires significantly less outcome compar-
isons compared to exhaustive search in most negotia-
tion instances.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Combinatorial domains
Let V = {X1, . . . , Xm} be a set of m attributes in
a combinatorial domain, For each X ∈ V, D (X) is
the domain of X. A variable X is binary if D (X) =
{x, x¯}. An alternative is uniquely identified by the
combination of its attribute values. Hence, there are
D(X1)×· · ·×D(Xm) possible alternatives (outcomes),
denoted by O. Elements of O are denoted by o, o′,
o′′ etc. and represented by concatenating the val-
ues of the variables. For example, if V = {A,B,C},
D(A) = {a, a¯}, D(B) = {b, b¯} andD(C) = {c, c¯}, then
the assignment ab¯c assigns a to variable A, b¯ to B and c
to C. If X = {Xσ1 , . . . , Xσ`} ⊆ V, with σ1 < · · · < σ`
then D (X) denotes D (Xσ1) × · · · × D (Xσ`) and x
(x ∈ D (X)) denotes an assignment of variable values
to X. If X = V, x is a complete assignment (corre-
sponds to a possible outcome); otherwise x is called a
partial assignment. If x and y are assignments to dis-
joint sets X and Y, respectively (X ∩Y = ∅), we de-
note the combination of x and y by xy. If X∪Y = V,
we call xy a completion of assignment x. We denote
by Comp(x) the set of completions of x. For any as-
signment x ∈ D (X), we denote by x [X] the value
x ∈ D (X) (X ∈ X) assigned to variable X by that
assignment; and x [W] denotes the assignment of vari-
able values w ∈ D (W) assigned to the set of vari-
ables W ⊆ X by that assignment. We allow con-
catenations of partial assignments. For instance, let
V = {A,B,C,D,E, F}, X = {A,B,C}, Y = {D,E},
x = ab¯c¯, y = d¯e, then xyf¯ denotes the alternative
ab¯c¯d¯ef¯ .
2.2 Preference in combinatorial domains
Preference indicates the ranking (or order, precedence)
of possible alternatives based on the satisfaction they
could provide for an agent. In decision-making the-
ory, the standard way to model the decision maker’s
preference is with his preference relations, also called a
binary relation [3]. Let o, o′ be two possible outcomes
o, o′ ∈ O. Then ’’ is a preference relation on O such
that oo′ if and only if o is at least as preferable as
o′ (or, o is weakly preferred to o′). And o is strictly
preferred to o′ (notation o  o′) if and only if oo′
but o′o. When oo′ and o′o, we say that the agent
is indifferent between these two outcomes, denoted by
o′ ∼ o. Moreover, in combinatorial domains, two out-
comes o and o′ can also be incomparable for an agent
when o  o′ and o′  o, denoted by o Z o′.
Given a problem over a combinatorial domain, the di-
rect assessment of the preference relations between al-
ternatives is usually infeasible due to the exponential
number of alternatives. AI researchers have been de-
veloping languages for representing preferences on such
domains in a succinct way, exploiting structural prop-
erties such as conditional preferential independence.
Preferential Independency
Let X, Y, and Z be nonempty sets that partition V
and  a preference relation over D (V). X is (con-
ditionally) preferentially independent of Y given Z iff
for all x,x′ ∈ D (X), y,y′ ∈ D (Y), z ∈ D (Z):
xyz  x′yz iff xy′z  x′y′z
Among those preference representation languages in
combinatorial domain, CP-net (Conditional Prefer-
ence Network) is one of the most studied languages.
CP-nets
A CP-net N [1] over a set of domain attribute V =
{X1, . . . , Xm} is an annotated directed graph G, in
which nodes stand for the problem attributes. Each
node X is annotated with a conditional preference
table CPT (X), which associates a total order X|u
with each instantiation u of X’s parents Pa (X), i.e.
u ∈ D (Pa (X)). For instance, let V = {A,B,C},
all three being binary, and assume that the preference
of a given agent over all possible outcomes can be de-
fined by a CP-net whose structural part is the directed
acyclic graph G = {(C,A) , (C,B) , (A,B)}; this means
that the agent’s preference over the values of C is un-
conditional, preference over the values of A (resp. B)
is fully determined given the value of C (resp. the val-
ues of C and A). The preference statements contained
in the conditional preference tables are written with
the usual notation, that is, a¯c : b¯  b means that when
A = a¯ and C = c, then B = b¯ is preferred to B = b
(see for example Figure 1(a)).
For clarity of presentation, we attempt to describe our
negotiation protocol with acyclic CP-nets, i.e., the re-
lation graph does not contain circle. However, the
proposed protocol can be used to handle various pref-
erences models and languages given the correspond-
ing techniques for answering dominance queries2 and
outcome optimization queries3. Notice that the ne-
gotiation process is elicitation-free: the agents are
2A dominance query, given two alternatives o and o′,
asks whether o is preferred to o′ with respect to an agent’s
preferences.
3An outcome optimization query determines the set
(a) Agent 1
(b) Agent 2
Figure 1: Two agents’ CP-nets
never asked to report their preferences. Therefore, the
agents are not going to reveal their CP-nets and the
structures of their CP-nets do not play any role.
3 Our proposed negotiation protocol
In this section we present our proposed protocol:
Protocol to reach Optimal agreement in Negotiation
over Combinatorial Domains (POANCD). Before we
go into technical detail, we first extend the concept
of Pareto-optimality and rational agent in negotiation
over combinatorial domains with incomparability.
Definition 1 (Pareto-optimality). An outcome o is
Weakly Pareto-optimal (WPO) if there exists no other
outcome o′ such that all agents strictly prefers o′ to o.
An outcome o is Pareto-optimal (PO) if there exists no
other outcome o′ such that o′ is at least as preferred
as o or incomparable with o for all agents, and strictly
preferred to o for at least one agent.
Pareto-optimality (PO) implies weak Pareto-
optimality (WPO). That is, when an alternative
is PO, it is also WPO. However, the reverse does not
hold: a WPO alternative is not necessarily PO.
Definition 2 (Rational agent). A rational agent i will
accept an agreement o′ instead of o only if o′ is at
least as preferred as o (o′ i o) or incomparable with
o (o′ Zi o).
That means, an rational agent i will accept an agree-
ment o′ instead of o only if o is not strictly preferred
to o′.
3.1 The framework
Negotiation tree
For a negotiation problem over m attributes V =
{X1, . . . , Xm}, we conceptualize the assignment of the
of non-dominated outcomes among the feasible outcome
space with respect to an agent’s preferences.
attribute values as a tree, known as the negotiation
tree. Let k be the maximum size of the attribute do-
main: ∀X ∈ V, |D (X)| ≤ k, the negotiation tree
is then a k-ary tree. The depth of the negotiation
tree is m with the root being at depth 0. We as-
sume that the set of attributes are ordered in some
way O = Xσ1 > · · · > Xσm , e.g., a random or-
der chosen by a non-bias natural device. The root
node represents an empty assignment; each path to a
node at depth ` specifies a unique value assignment
assg ∈ D(Xσ1)× · · · ×D(Xσ`) to the set of attributes
{Xσ1 , . . . , Xσ`} in that order. Each node at depth m
represents one possible alternative (outcome) and the
path to reach that node from the root specifies the
complete assignment to the set of domain attributes
according to that alternative. Such a negotiation tree
is shown in Figure 2 for a bilateral negotiation scenario
over a set of three attributes V = {A,B,C}, where
the agents preferences are presented by the CP-nets
depicted in Figure 1.
A negotiation tree is created iteratively by the negoti-
ating agents in a distributed manner and under incom-
plete information setting. In each iteration, the only
information that each agent obtains is the nodes in the
negotiation tree which are currently available for him
to make a proposal on. There is no prior information
about the preferences of the opponents. Moreover, the
proposals made by an agent during negotiation are in-
visible for its opponents. The procedure starts with a
root with an empty assignment. The negotiation tree
is then created in a top-down process, where in each it-
eration of negotiation, each agent can only choose one
of the existing leaf nodes in the negotiation tree to
make a proposal on. Note that the negotiating agents
may make proposals on different nodes in an iteration
of negotiation. Note also that each agent is not allowed
to make proposals on the same node more than once
during the entire negotiation process. Once a leaf node
η at depth ` (` < m) is agreed by all the participat-
ing agents (i.e., every agent has at some point made
a proposal on that node during negotiation), the sub-
tree of η will be expanded with every possible value
assigns to the next attribute Xσ`+1 ; and these children
nodes will be explored by the agents and be available
for them to make proposals on in the next iteration.
We formally describe the following definitions of open
nodes and agreement nodes in a negotiation tree.
Definition 3 (Open node). A node η in the nego-
tiation tree is marked as open if and only if it is a
leaf node and it is agreed by all the negotiation agents,
i.e., every agent has ever made a proposal on this node
during negotiation (not necessarily in the current iter-
ation).
Note that once a node η at depth ` (` < m) is marked
as open in the current iteration, it will be expanded
with every possible value assigns to the next attribute
Xσ`+1 . Thus, in the next iteration, η is not an open
node any more, because it will no longer be a leaf node.
Definition 4 (Agreement node). A node η in the ne-
gotiation tree is an agreement node if and only if it is
an open node at depth m.
An initial agreement is reached if there is at least one
agreement node in the negotiation tree. The path to
reach an agreement node from the root specifies the
complete assignment to the set of domain attributes
that the agents have agreed on during negotiation.
Best possible agreement (BPA)
At each node η of the negotiation tree, each agent i has
a best possible agreement on that node, denoted by
BPAi (η), which is the optimistic outcome that agent
i can obtain with the values assigned to the attributes
along the path from the root to η being fixed. Let
assg = PATH(η) be the value assignment specified by
the path from the root to η, then BPAi (η) is the best
outcome among the completions of assg (Comp(assg))
for agent i. Moreover, the best possible agreement
(BPA) of the root node for an agent corresponds to the
optimal (best) alternative of that agent in the entire
outcome space, i.e. each attribute is assigned a most
preferred value according to that agent’s preference.
In the context of acyclic CP-nets, computing the best
possible agreement of a node for an agent is similar to
the individual outcome optimization with constraints
(i.e., the values assigned to the attributes along the
path from the root node to the current node being
fixed) [1]. We simply need to sweep through the
network from ancestors to descendants, assigning the
most preferred value to each remaining attribute X
(i.e., the attribute that has not been assigned a value
along the path) respecting to the parent context. For
instance, consider the agents’ CP-nets in Figure 1 and
assume a path assignment for a node η is a. Accord-
ing to agent 1’s CP-net in Figure 1(a), we consider an
order over attributes from ancestors to descendants:
O = C > A > B. We first assign c to C, because
c  c¯. The next variable to be considered is B, be-
cause the value of A has already been specified by the
path to η. Then we assign b to B, because b  b¯ given
A = a and C = c. Consequently, BPA1(η) = abc.
Similarly, for agent 2, BPA2(η) = ab¯c¯.
3.2 The process of negotiation
We now present an example of a bilateral negotia-
tion scenario using POANCD in combinatorial domains.
POANCD is defined in two phases. The first phase of
POANCD consists of distributed formation of a negoti-
ation tree by the participating agents. After the first
phase, the agents will be left with a few initial agree-
ments. In the second phase, the agents will act coop-
eratively to achieve Pareto-optimal agreement by ex-
ploring possible mutually beneficial alternatives.
First phase of POANCD:
Step 1: A random device chooses an order over the
domain attributes, e.g., O = Xσ1 > · · · > Xσm ,
such that the negotiation tree is created following
that order. Initially, a root node and all its possi-
ble |D(Xσ1)| children nodes (each branch assigns
a distinct value to the attribute Xσ1) are created
in the negotiation tree.
Step 2: Each negotiating agent makes a proposal on
an existing leaf node in the negotiation tree.
After each agent makes a proposal, let Q denotes
the set of nodes marked as open in the current
iteration. Note that there would be at most two
nodes marked as open in each iteration (|Q| ≤ 2),
because we are considering a bilateral negotiation
and in each iteration, each agent can only make a
proposal on one node 4.
• If there exist at least one agreement nodes in
the negotiation tree, collect the set of open
nodes Q and go to Step 3.
• Otherwise, for each η ∈ Q, let ` denotes the
depth of η, and thus the next attribute to be
considered in the subtree of η is Xσ`+1 . Ex-
pand η with all possible |D(Xσ`+1)| children
nodes in the negotiation tree; and go back to
Step 2.
Remark. The negotiation process takes place un-
der incomplete information setting and in a dis-
tributive environment. In each iteration of nego-
tiation, each agent i only knows a set of nodes
(options), denoted by Ωi, on which he can make
proposals, i.e., the set of leaf nodes in the nego-
tiation tree that he has not made a proposal on
during the previously rounds. For each node η in
Ωi, an agent i will have a best possible agreement
(BPA) of η (BPAi(η)), which indicates the opti-
mistic outcome that agent i can obtain following
the subtree of η. An agent can always choose to go
backward as long as the BPA of the current node
is less preferred than that of another node. Thus,
a rational agent will always try to get the most
preferred alternative among the possible options.
Consequently, we consider the following strategy
4In a multilateral negotiation, there may be more than
two nodes marked as open in an iteration of negotiation.
in negotiation: chooses a node η ∈ Ωi whose BPA
is the best among the BPAs of the nodes in Ωi.
That means, there does not exist another node η′
in Ωi (η′ , η), such that BPAi(η′) i BPAi(η).
As an implementation, each agent can maintain a
priority queue of feasible leaf nodes to make pro-
posals on, known as the fringe. The nodes in an
agent’s fringe is sorted according to the prefer-
ence ordering over the BPAs of these nodes for
that agent. The more preferred the BPAi(η) is,
the higher priority the node η is in the fringe of
agent i. In each iteration of negotiation, for each
agent i, the first node is removed from the fringe
and agent i will make a proposal in the negoti-
ation tree on that node. If there are new nodes
created in the negotiation tree (i.e., the children
nodes of the open nodes created in the current it-
eration), each agent will add the new nodes into
its fringe according to its own preference order-
ing on the BPAs. Figure 3 shows an example of
two participating agents’ fringes in a bilateral
negotiation corresponding to the negotiation sce-
nario depicted in Figure 2. Note that with acyclic
CP-nets, the BPA is always unique at each node
of the negotiation tree. With other types of pref-
erence when there may exist more than one best
possible agreements, the BPA can be defined as a
set of most preferred outcomes, which will be all
added into the fringe. The fringe will be sorted
and in the next iteration the agent will choose the
first one to make an offer on. Finally notice that
even if the BPA of a node is unique, the fringe
can also contain incomparable outcomes, i.e., the
BPA of different nodes in the tree might be in-
comparable.
Step 3: We refer to the set of agreement nodes as A
and the set of agreements (complete assignments)
corresponding to the agreement nodes in A as I:
I = {o∗ | o∗ = PATH(η∗) and η∗ ∈ A}, where
PATH(η∗) denotes the value assignment to the set
of domain attributes specified by the path from
the root to η∗. Note that an agreement node is
also an open node, thus A ⊆ Q.
• If Q = A, the first phase ends and proceed
to the second phase.
• Otherwise, the set Q must contain one agree-
ment node at depth m, denoted by η∗; and
one open node at depth ` (` < m), denoted
by η′. That means, in the last iteration, an
agent i makes a proposal on η∗, which has
been agreed by the other agent j (i , j) dur-
ing a previous iteration of negotiation; and
the other agent j makes a proposal on η′,
which has been agreed by agent i in a previ-
ous iteration of negotiation. Let o∗ be the
complete assignment (alternative) specified
by the path from the root to the agreement
node η∗. Even though η′ is not an agreement
node, there does exist a potential agreement
under the subtree of η′, because both agents
have agreed on η′. Moreover, this potential
agreement can not be strictly preferred to o∗
for agent j (otherwise, he would have made
a proposal on η′ before he makes a proposal
η∗), but may be more preferred than o∗ to
agent i. However, since there already exists
an agreement o∗, agent j will not make fur-
ther concession in the subtree of η′. Conse-
quently, in order to be fair, we ask agent j,
who proposes η′ in the last iteration, to give
out the BPA of η′ (BPAj(η′)). Then agent i
can either choose to include BPAj(η′) in the
initial agreement set: I = I ∪ {BPAj(η′)};
or stick with the current set I. Note that
agent i will choose to include BPAj(η′) only
if o∗ i BPAj(η′). The first phase ends and
proceed to the second phase with a set of ini-
tial agreements I.
Second phase of POANCD (Enhancement):
This phase is also called the enhancement phase, in
which the participating agents will act cooperatively
to explore possible mutually beneficial agreements and
decide on the final agreement. We first introduce the
following notations:
1. let Ωi denote the set of leaf nodes in the negotia-
tion tree that agent i has not yet made a proposal
on during the first phase of negotiation, i.e., the
remaining nodes in agent i’s fringe;
2. For each initial agreement o∗ ∈ I and each nego-
tiating agent i, let:
• Γi(o∗) denote the set of nodes in Ωi (Γi(o∗) ∈
Ωi) whose BPAs are indifferent or incompa-
rable with o∗ for agent i: Γi(o∗) = {η ∈
Ωi | BPAi(η) ∼i o∗ or BPAi(η) Zi o∗}; and
• Θi(o∗) denote the corresponding set of agent
i’s BPAs of the nodes in Γi(o∗) : Θi(o∗) =
{o | o = BPAi(η) and η ∈ Γi(o∗)}.
Notice that for any node η in Ωi, BPAi(η) can not
be strictly preferred to o∗ for agent i. Otherwise,
agent i would have made a proposal at η before he
makes a proposal on the corresponding agreement
node of o∗.
In this phase, for each initial agreement o∗, let us de-
fine a set Φ(o∗), which is the set of Pareto-optimal
alternatives that can possibly replace o∗ in I. Origi-
nally, Φ(o∗) = ∅. Each agent i gives out Θi(o∗), then
the other agent (agent j) can either choose one of the
alternatives in Θi(o∗) to put in Φ(o∗) or stick with o∗.
Note that agent j will choose an alternative o′ from
Θi(o∗) to put in Φ(o∗) only if o∗ j o′; and the al-
ternative o′ that agent j chooses would be the best
alternative among Θi(o∗) for agent j. If Φ(o∗) , ∅,
then o∗ in I will be replaced by the outcomes in Φ(o∗).
Finally, after the second phase, the set I contains the
set of final agreements. If only one element remains in
I, it will be selected as the final agreement. Otherwise,
any one of them will be chosen randomly as the final
agreement.
3.3 Formal properties of POANCD
In this section, we discuss the formal properties of the
proposed POANCD negotiation protocol. The objective
of an efficient protocol is to lead rational agents to
efficient agreements [9]. We present the formal proof of
Pareto-optimality of our proposed protocol as follows.
Theorem 1. The agreements reached by POANCD is
Pareto-optimal.
In order to proof this theorem, we first need to proof
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The initial agreements reached in the
first phase of POANCD is weakly Pareto-optimal.
Proof. Assume first that an initial agreement o∗ on
node η∗ that the agents reach in the first phase of
POANCD is not weakly Pareto-optimal, then there exists
another alternative o′, such that for any agent i: o′ i
o∗. We assume η′ is a leaf node whose path assignment
is coincided with o′. For any agent i, BPAi(η′) i o′
and thus BPAi(η′) i o∗. Then both agents will make
the proposals on η′ or the nodes in the subtree of η′
before they make proposals on η∗; and η∗ will not be
an agreement node, contradicting the face that o∗ is an
initial agreements from the first phase of negotiation.

Proof of Theorem 1. From Proposition 1 we know
that the initial agreements the agents reach in the
first phase of negotiation is weakly Pareto-optimal. In
the second phase, the agents are acting cooperatively
to reach Pareto-optimal agreements by replacing each
inefficient initial agreement o∗ with a set of Pareto-
optimal alternatives Φ(o∗), such that every alternative
o′ ∈ Φ(o∗) is indifferent or incomparable with o∗ for
one agent i, and is more preferred than o∗ for the other
agent j. Moreover, after an agent i gives out the set
Θi(o∗), if the other agent j would like to replace o∗
in I, the alternative he chooses from Θi(o∗) will be
the best one among Θi(o∗). Consequently, the final
agreement reached by POANCD is Pareto-optimal. 
3.4 An illustration
Now, we demonstrate the execution of POANCD with an
example. Assume two agents are negotiating over a set
of three binary-valued attributes V = {A,B,C}. The
negotiating agents’ preferences are depicted in Fig-
ure 1. As all attributes are binary, the negotiation
tree is a binary tree. In the first phase, firstly, an or-
dering over the attributes is randomly generated, e.g.,
we consider the ordering O = A > B > C following
which the negotiation tree will be created. Each node
η in the negotiation tree associates with a proposal ta-
ble, in which the first row displays the proposals that
the agents make on that node: the left (resp. right)
column depicts the proposal that agent 1 (resp. agent
2) makes; each proposal is marked with a number that
depicts the number of the current iteration, i.e., a pro-
posal marked by "(p)" (resp. "<p>"), is the proposal
that agent 1 (resp. agent 2) makes in the pth iteration.
For explanation purpose, we also attach the best pos-
sible agreements (BPA) of both agents at each node
in the second row of the table: the left (resp. right)
column depicts the BPA of that node of agent 1 (resp.
agent 2). However, it is important to note that the in-
formation including the proposal that an agent makes
and the BPA of a node of that agent is its private
information and invisible for its opponent. Figure 2
shows the formation of the negotiation tree in the first
phase of POANCD and Figure 3 provides an illustration
of the ongoing changes occurs in each agent’s fringe
5. For the purpose of explanation, we also provide
both participating agents’ preference orderings over
the outcome space in Figure 4, which are induced from
the corresponding agents’ CP-nets in Figure 1. How-
ever, note that the agents do not need to reason about
the preference relations over the entire outcome space
during negotiation. They only need to answer a few
dominance queries when adding new nodes into their
fringes.
Initially, a root node is created in the negotiation tree.
Since the first attribute to be considered is A and
D|A| = {a, a¯}, two children nodes η1, η2 from the
branch a, a¯ are created in the negotiation tree. Each
agent will create a fringe and add η1 and η2 into its
fringe according to their preference orderings on the
BPAs of η1 and η2. For instance, BPA1(η1) = abc,
BPA1(η2) = a¯b¯c, because abc 1 a¯b¯c (see the prefer-
ence ordering of agent 1 in Figure 4(a)), the order in
agent 1’s fringe is η1η2. Similarly, the order in agent
2’s fringe is η1η2.
5The nodes depicts in red colour are the new nodes cre-
ated in that iteration.
Figure 2: Negotiation tree
In the 1st iteration, each agent will make a proposal
on one of the leaf nodes in the negotiation tree. For
instance, the first node η1 in agent 1’s fringe is pop
out and agent 1 makes a proposal (1) at η1 in the nego-
tiation tree. Similarly, agent 2 also makes a proposal
<1> on node η1. η1 is marked as open in this iter-
ation and Q = {η1}. Since the next attribute to be
considered in the subtree of η1 is B and D(B) = {b, b¯}.
Two children nodes η3, η4 of η1 from the branches b, b¯
respectively are created in the negotiation tree. Each
agent adds these two nodes into its own fringe accord-
ing to its preference. For instance, BPA1(η2) = a¯b¯c,
BPA1(η3) = abc, BPA1(η4) = ab¯c, and because
abc 1 ab¯c 1 a¯b¯c, the fringe of agent 1 is η3η4η2
(Figure 3(a)); similarly the fringe of agent 2 is η4η2η3
(Figure 3(b)).
In the 2nd iteration, agent 1 makes a proposal (2) on
node η3 and agent 2 makes a proposal <2> on η4. In
this iteration, there is no open node (Q = ∅); agent
1’s fringe is η4η2 and agent 2’s fringe is η2η3.
In the 3rd iteration, agent 1 continues to make a pro-
posal (3) on η4 (i.e., the first node in its fringe) and
agent 2 makes a proposal <3> on node η2. There is
one node marked as open in the current negotiation
tree: Q = {η4}, thus we created two children nodes
η5, η6 of η4 from the branches assign c and c¯ to the
next attribute C respectively. Both agents add these
two nodes into their fringes for consideration accord-
ing to their preferences over the BPAs of the nodes:
agent 1’s fringe becomes η5η2η6 and agent 2’s fringe
becomes η6η5η3.
In the 4th iteration, agent 1 makes a proposal (4) on
η5 and agent 2 makes a proposal <4> on node η6. No
node is marked as open in this iteration of negotiation;
agent 1’s fringe is η2η6 and agent 2’s fringe is η5η3.
Finally, in the last iteration (the 5th iteration), agent
1 makes a proposal (5) on node η2 and agent 2 makes
a proposal <5> on node η5. As such, in this iteration,
there are two nodes marked as open: Q = {η2, η5}.
(a) Agent 1 (b) Agent 2
Figure 3: The fringes of the agents in the negotiation
(a) Agent 1
(b) Agent 2
Figure 4: The preference orderings of two agents
Moreover, since η5 is an agreement node (i.e., it is at
depth 3), Step 2 ends and we proceed to Step 3 of the
first phase.
As A = {η5} and A , Q, Q contains one agreement
node η5 (the path from the root to η5 specifies a com-
plete assignment ab¯c); and one open node η2 (the path
from the root to η2 specifies a partial assignment a¯).
Since agent 1 is the proposer of node η2 in the last iter-
ation, it gives out its BPA of η2: BPA1(η2) = a¯b¯c. For
agent 2, as a¯b¯c 2 ab¯c (see the preference ordering of
agent 2 in Figure 4(b)), agent 2 will include a¯b¯c in the
set of initial agreements. Consequently, the first phase
ends and we proceed to the second phase of POANCD
with the set of initial agreements I = {ab¯c, a¯b¯c}.
Originally, F = {ab¯c, a¯b¯c}. For the initial agreement
ab¯c, originally Φ(ab¯c) = ∅. For agent 1, there is only
one leaf node η6 that he has not yet made a proposal
on (Ω1 = {η6}) and BPA1(η6) = ab¯c¯. Since ab¯c 1
ab¯c¯, there is no node in Ω1 whose BPA is indifference
or incomparable with ab¯c for agent 1, Γ1(ab¯c) = ∅
and thus Θ1(ab¯c) = ∅. Similarly, for agent 2 whose
CP-net induced a strict total preference ordering over
the outcome space (see Figure 4(b)), the BPAs of the
leaf nodes that he has not yet made proposals on are
less preferred than the current agreement ab¯c. Hence,
Γ2(ab¯c) = ∅ and Θ2(ab¯c) = ∅. Consequently, Φ(ab¯c) =
∅ and ab¯c will not be replaced. Similarly, for another
initial agreement a¯b¯c, Φ(a¯b¯c) = ∅ and a¯b¯c will not be
replaced. Consequently, both initial agreements ab¯c
and a¯b¯c are Pareto-optimal and we obtain the set of
final agreements F = {ab¯c, a¯b¯c}. As F contains more
than one element, we randomly select one of them as
the final agreement and the negotiation process ends.
4 Experiment
We now describe the results of experiments that show
the feasibility and computational efficiency of our pro-
posed POANCD protocol to bilateral negotiation in com-
binatorial domains with respect to (i) the number of
attributes sattr and domain size sds that can be effi-
ciently handled in practice; (ii) the corresponding out-
come space sos and the average number of different
outcomes (alternatives) sout that each agent needs to
consider during the entire negotiation process; (iii) the
average number of dominance queries (outcome com-
parisons) sdq that each agent needs to answer during
the entire negotiation process; (iv) the average number
of iterations siter that the first phase of the negotia-
tion process involves; and (v) the average execution
time stime of the entire negotiation process.
In these experiments, we use CP-nets for representing
the agents’ preferences in negotiation. We consider
a simple CP-net structure, i.e., directed-path singly
connected CP-nets; and we restrict the maximum in-
degree of each node in the generated CP-nets to 5.
We generate random preference networks by varying
the number of attributes, the structure of the network
and the preferences for the attributes. In the nego-
tiation process, we use the individual outcome opti-
mization technique in CP-nets introduced in [1] and
the heuristic approach to answer dominance query in
CP-nets introduced by Li et al. [6].
We first conduct the experiments for binary-valued
CP-nets, in which the number of attributes sattr is
varying from 2 to 100 and for each number of at-
tributes we run 1000 rounds of experiments by ran-
domly generating two negotiating agents’ preferences.
Table 1 shows the experimental result in binary CP-
nets. The average number of outcomes sout that each
agent needs to consider, the average number of dom-
inance queries sdq, the average number of iterations
siter and the average execution time stime are increas-
ing as the number of attributes increases. However,
we can observe that the proposed negotiation proto-
col POANCD can efficiently handle large number of at-
tributes in negotiation with binary CP-nets. Com-
pared to the huge outcome space, by using the pro-
posed protocol POANCD, the average number of alter-
natives sout that each agent needs to consider is signif-
icantly reduced (comparing the second and third col-
umn of Table 1). When the number of attributes is
large (e.g., 100), on average, the number of dominance
queries sdq that each agent needs to answer during the
entire negotiation process is less than 420 and the first
Table 1: Negotiations with binary CP-nets
sattr sos sout sdq siter stime (sec)
2 4 2.80 5.36 3.38 0.10
10 1024 15.84 45.05 17.70 0.30
20 1048576 31.19 86.03 34.31 1.06
50 250 77.67 207.42 84.28 6.60
100 2100 155.14 410.62 168.09 30.03
Table 2: Negotiations with multi-valued CP-nets
sattr sos sout sdq siter stime (sec)
2 25 2.81 17.24 4.17 0.05
5 3125 8.56 70.18 12.21 0.78
10 9765625 16.06 125.69 22.86 9.81
15 215 ∼ 515 22.71 169.99 32.75 151.20
25 225 ∼ 525 37.75 266.62 53.06 301.05
phase of negotiation finishes in less than 170 rounds.
Moreover, according to the experiment data, when the
number of attributes is 100, on average, the entire ne-
gotiation process ends in about 30 seconds.
We extend the experiment for multi-value CP-nets (see
Table 2). For multi-valued CP-nets, we restrict the
maximum domain size to 5. We vary the number of
attributes sattr from 2 to 25 and for each number of
attributes we run 500 rounds of experiments. Simi-
lar to the scenario with binary-valued CP-nets, sout,
sdq, siter and stime are increasing as the number of
attributes increases. However, although with 25 at-
tributes (in which case the maximum domain size is
525), on average, each agent only needs to consider less
than 40 alternatives and answer less than 300 domi-
nance queries during the whole negotiation process;
the first phase of POANCD finishes in about 50 itera-
tions. Moreover, according to the experimental data,
on average the entire negotiation process ends in about
300 seconds with 25 attributes. Note that in multi-
value CP-nets, answering dominance queries is much
more complex than that in binary-valued CP-nets.
From the experiment, we can conclude that our pro-
posed POANCD protocol is computationally efficient. It
allows preferences structures that are quite large and
complex to be executed in reasonable time.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose an efficient distributed nego-
tiation protocol, POANCD, for negotiation in combinato-
rial domains when the agents do not know the prefer-
ences of each other and they do not want to reveal their
preferences for the possible alternatives during the pro-
cess of negotiation. We have theoretically shown that
POANCD leads rational agents to Pareto-optimal agree-
ments. We have also experimentally shown the sig-
nificant reduction of search efforts and the number of
dominance queries each participating agent needs to
answer by using the proposed protocol.
A major advantage of POANCD is its extensibility to
multilateral negotiation. We have presented POANCD
for bilateral negotiation, but extension to multilateral
negotiation can be done with minor modifications.
However, the negotiation scenarios with cyclic or in-
consistent preferences need to be further explored, be-
cause there may be more than one best possible agree-
ment (BPA) of a node in a negotiation tree. Moreover,
the fairness issue of the negotiated outcome using the
proposed protocol is also an important aspect of future
research.
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